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An increasing number of businesses and organisations rely on existing users for finding new users or spread-
ing a message. One of the widely used “refer-a-friend” mechanisms offers an equal reward to both the re-
ferrer and the invitee. This mechanism provides incentives for direct referrals and is fair to the invitee. On
the other hand, multi-level marketing and recent social mobilisation experiments focus on mechanisms that
incentivise both direct and indirect referrals. Such mechanisms share the reward for inviting a new member
among the ancestors, usually in geometrically decreasing shares. A new member receives nothing at the
time of joining. We study fairness in multi-level marketing mechanisms. We show how characteristic func-
tion games can be used to model referral marketing, show how the canonical fairness concept of the Shapley
value can be applied to this setting, and establish the complexity of finding the Shapley value in each class,
and provide a comparison of the Shapley value-based mechanism to existing referral mechanisms.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems; J.4
[Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics
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1. INTRODUCTION
Social networks and email made it easy to share information. These tools provide pow-
erful ways to spread a message without using mainstream media. Compelling exam-
ples of their use can be found in politics (e.g., twitter revolutions), humanitarian relief
(e.g., help-maps such as Ushahidi in post-earthquake Haiti), businesses (e.g., promot-
ing products through Facebook), and entertainment (e.g., music videos such as Gang-
nam Style). Many famous cases of messages going viral are organic: users share be-
cause they like the message, or identify with it.1 However, it is hard to make a message
viral by design, and in fact very few messages achieve viral stardom. A more realistic
goal is a moderate level of social reach achieved be providing incentives for sharing
information.
The marketing literature acknowledges the importance of referral incentives [But-
tle 1998] but provides limited guidance on how to design them (see, e.g., [Biyalogorsky
et al. 2001]). Multi-level marketing mechanisms—mechanisms that offer not only di-
rect but also indirect referrals—have recently received some attention in computer
science. Some of the interest has been fuelled by a social mobilisation experiment
known as the Red Balloon Challenge [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
2010], which provided validation for using multi-level mechanisms for referral incen-
tivisation in a non-commercial context. The task posed by the challenge was to locate
ten red weather balloons moored at undisclosed locations throughout the US. The win-
ning incentive mechanism [Pickard et al. 2011] shared the reward associated with
each balloon in a recursive manner: the referrer received half of the finder’s prize, the
referrer’s referrer received a quarter, etc. In the context of multi-level marketing this
is an example of a geometric reward mechanism.
1For example, an absurd and funny Old Spice commercial collected nearly 50 million views http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=owGykVbfgUE
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An axiomatic justification of geometric mechanisms appears in [Emek et al. 2011].
An important property for such mechanisms is Sybil-proofness: i.e., the users should
have no incentive to create fake identities of themselves. Sybil-proof mechanisms have
been studied in a number of papers including [Babaioff et al. 2012; Drucker and Fleis-
cher 2012; Chen et al. 2013; Lv and Moscibroda 2013]. Work on referral incentives
has also been carried out in the model of Query Incentive Networks (QIN) [Kleinberg
and Raghavan 2005], where the root of a tree needs to incentivise the nodes to propa-
gate the query until a node holding the answer is reached. Performance of geometric
mechanisms in QINs was analyzed in [Cebrian et al. 2012].
A number of desirable properties that a referral incentive mechanism should satisfy
are described in [Douceur and Moscibroda 2007]. One of the properties relevant to fair-
ness is “value proportional to contribution”. This property ensures that a user recovers
a fraction of the effort he has put in. The effort, however, refers to performing non-
recruitment activities such as sharing files on a p2p network or classifying galaxies on
GalaxyZoo.
Unlike the above-cited work, our interest is in fairness when applied to referrals
as opposed to other types of contributions. In this work, the contribution of a node
is measured by the descendents he brings. We formalise a class of cooperative games
that enables us to model such contributions. This class of games, which we call tree
games2 allows us to formally study fairness in referral mechanisms by applying the
best-known game-theoretic fairness model—the Shapley value [Shapley 1953].
The work is motivated not only by an academic interest in applying a standard fair-
ness concept to a new and popular domain, but also by the fact that fairness of referral
mechanisms is important in practice. In particular, many popular mechanisms com-
pensate not only the referrer but also the invitee with an equal reward. Examples of
such fair “refer-a-friend” mechanisms include Dropbox and GiffGaff where both the
referrer and the invitee receive 500Mb of extra space or £5, respectively, for each suc-
cessful referral of a new user. As we will show, compensation based on the Shapley
value combines features of both fair refer-a-friend mechanisms and geometric mecha-
nisms. Specifically, the Shapley value of an invitee is non-zero, and all of the ancestors
are compensated.
The following example illustrates our work.
Example 1.1. The Dropbox referral program offers 500MB of extra free space to
the referrer and the invitee. Since a fixed amount is awarded for each referral, we can
say that Dropbox values each referral at 1GB per user. Consider the referral tree on
the right of Figure 1: 1 invites 3 who invites 6 and 7.
There are 3 referrals, so Dropbox will distribute 3GB of free space. Under the Dropbox’s
refer-a-friend scheme, user 1 receives 500MB when he invites 3. User 3 receives 500MB
when accepting the referral from 1. Inviting 6 and 7 gives 3 an extra 500MB more for
each invite. Users 6 and 7 receive 500MB at the time of joining. Distributing 3GB
according to the geometric mechanism that passes 12 of referral reward to the referrer,
results in user 1 receiving 12 for 3 and
1
4 for each of 6 and 7. User 3 receives
1
2 for each
of 6 and 7. The total shares for splitting 3GB are (1, 1, 0, 0) giving 1.5GB to nodes 1
and 3 and nothing to the leaf nodes 6 and 7. The resulting compensations are shown in
Table I.
The current Dropbox mechanism is fair to the invitee: the invitee gets the same
reward as the referrer. However it is not fair to nodes who bring many descendants,
as a node is compensated only for direct referrals but not for the nodes his children
2Not to be confused with game trees.
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Table I. Referrers’ compensation for the tree on
the right of Figure 1.
1 3 6 7
Dropbox 500 1, 500 500 500
Geometric 1, 500 1, 500 0 0
Shapley 1, 167 1, 167 333 333
bring. On the other hand, the geometric mechanism acknowledges indirect referrals
(node 1 is compensated for nodes 6 and 7) but does not provide any compensation to
the invitees at the time of joining. This can be viewed as unfair by the invited node.
Our interest is in defining a mechanism that is fair to everyone. Every node joining
through a referral brings value to Dropbox, and each should acknowledged. However,
nodes whose referral activity brings more new customers should receive more. The
mechanism that we derive using the game-theoretic concept of Shapley value satisfied
both of these properties.
The derivation of the Shapley value for a general class of referral marketing games
follows in Section 3, but for the simple example given here, the Shapley-value mech-
anism has a simple form: the value of a referral is distributed in equal shares among
the invitee and all of his ancestors. Thus, when node 6 joins, nodes 1, 3, and 6 receive
333MB each. The final distribution of the reward appears in Table I.
The example illustrates how referral marketing can be modelled by referral trees.
Specifically, there is one special node, the root, that initiates referral activities. This
node can be viewed as a customer who joined Dropbox independently. The root node
can invite its friends, and each successful referral has a value associated with it that
can be shared among the joining nodes. However, if an invitation is not made, that is if
an edge is removed, then the entire bottom subtree does not join. This modelling choice
means that there is a single chance for each node to get invited. This assumption is
consistent with most models in the referral literature [Babaioff et al. 2012; Cebrian
et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2013; Douceur and Moscibroda 2007; Drucker and Fleischer
2012; Emek et al. 2011; Kleinberg and Raghavan 2005; Lv and Moscibroda 2013]. This
corresponds to modelling the referral process as trees where a node can be referred
by only one other node, as opposed to graphs allowing multiple referrals. Considering
graphs in general is an interesting open question, but given that they occur naturally
in many settings, trees seem an obvious place to start an analysis.
A model related to ours was studied in [Myerson 1977]. Myerson defined games on
graphs where the graph encodes which of the players can cooperate. The value of a
coalition is then defined as the sum of the values of connected components in it. For
the graph model, Myerson proved that there is one value that meets certain natural
fairness axioms, and this value equals the Shapley value. We take the graph games to
the referral marketing domain. Our model is a special case where the graph is a tree
and the value of any connected component not containing the root is zero.
Interestingly, since our model is a special case of [Myerson 1977], the fairness ax-
ioms defined there carry over to our marketing domain. In particular, this means that
any two players on both sides of the edge profit from the edge equally. This property
provides justification for using the Shapley value in the referral marketing context.
“Refer-a-friend” mechanisms such as Dropbox equally compensate the referral and the
invitee. The Shapley value on referral trees generalises this fairness property to in-
direct referrals. Thus, the Shapley value compensates all types of contributions—it is
not only the direct referrals that matter but also the indirect ones—and it provides a
fair way of compensating the referrer and the invitee in equal shares.
Our main contribution is a fair mechanism for referral marketing. To this end, we
introduce tree games that allow us to model rewards in multi-level marketing. We
4 T. Rahwan et al.
present a simple technique for computing the Shapley value in the subclass where each
referral has a fixed value, and a simplified computation for the general tree games. In
the example above, each referral carried the same value of 1GB. Our work extends to
cases where the contribution of a referral depends on the total number of nodes that
join or, in the most general case on the identities of all of the nodes that join.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is intended to famil-
iarise the reader with the necessary concepts from cooperative game theory. In Sec-
tion 3, we introduce a class of games defined over trees, and show how the Shapley
value can be computed for these games, thus providing a fair compensation for re-
ferral activities. Section 3.3 focuses on a natural subclass of games where we show
that the Shapley value is computable in linear time. Section 4 concludes the paper
and presents some potential future extensions. Appendix A provides a summary of the
main notation used throughout the paper.
2. GAME THEORETIC BACKGROUND
In this section, we will introduce some necessary definitions and concepts from coop-
erative game theory.
A characteristic function game is a pair (A, v), where A = {1, . . . , n} is a set of
players (or agents), and v : 2A → R is a characteristic function that maps each subset
(or coalition) of agents, C ⊆ A, to a real number, v(C), which represents the payoff of
C. This number is called the value of coalition C.
A coalition structure, CS ⊆ 2A, is a partition of A into disjoint and exhaustive
coalitions. The set of possible coalition structures is denoted as CSA.
An outcome of a game is a pair, (CS ,x), where CS ∈ CSA is a coalition structure,
and x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a payoff vector, which specifies a payoff, xi, for every agent i ∈ A,
such that: xi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m, and
∑
i∈C xi = v(C) for all C ∈ CS . Intuitively,
an outcome specifies which coalitions to form, and how the payoff of each coalition is
divided among its members.
A solution concept specifies the set of outcomes that meet certain criteria. In this
context, one desirable criterion is stability; an outcome, (CS ,x), is said to be stable
if no group of agents can receive a payoff greater than what was allocated to them in
that outcome, i.e., if
∑
i∈C xi ≥ v(C),∀C ⊆ A. The set of all stable outcomes in a game
is called the core of that game [Gillies 1959]. In general, the problem of determining
whether there exists a stable outcome is NP-complete [Conitzer and Sandholm 2003].
Fairness is another desirable criterion when dealing with outcomes; it is typically
evaluated based on the degree to which every agent’s payoff reflects its contribution.
In this vein, the best-known solution concept is the Shapley value [Shapley 1953].
To formally present this concept, we need to first introduce the notion of marginal
contribution.
Definition 2.1. [Marginal Contribution] Given a characteristic function game,
(A, v), the marginal contribution of an agent i ∈ A to a coalition C ⊆ A \ {i} is de-
noted by mc(i, C), and defined as the difference in value that is caused when i joins C.
Formally:
mc(i, C) = v(C ∪ {i})− v(C). (1)
Finally, let ΠA denote the set of all permutations of A. For any arbitrary permutation,
pi ∈ ΠA, let pi(i) be the location of i in pi, and let Cpii be the coalition consisting of the
agents that precede i in pi. Formally,
Cpii = {j ∈ A : pi(j) < pi(i)}.
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Now, we are ready to define the Shapley value—a solution concept that specifies how
to divide the value of the grand coalition, i.e., the coalition containing all agents. Ac-
cording to the Shapley value, the payoff of an agent, i ∈ A, equals its average marginal
contribution to the agents that precede it in an arbitrary permutation. This payoff is
referred to as the Shapley value of i. Formally:
Definition 2.2. [Shapley Value] Given a characteristic function game (A, v), the
Shapley value of an agent i ∈ A is denoted by Shi and is given by
Shi =
1
n!
∑
pi∈ΠA
mc(i, Cpii ). (2)
The outcome ({A}, (Sh1, . . . ,Shn)) is called the Shapley value of (A, v).
Due to its various desirable properties [Shapley 1953], the Shapley value is arguably
the fairest solution concept known to date in cooperative game theory .
A special class of coalitional games are convex games [Shapley 1971]. A character-
istic function game (A, v) is said to be convex if v is supermodular, i.e., if
v(C ∪ C ′) + v(C ∩ C ′) ≥ v(C) + v(C ′), ∀C,C ′ ⊆ A.
Some of the desirable properties of convex games include the fact that the Shapley
value is always in the core, which implies that the core is always non-empty [Shapley
1971].
3. TREE GAMES
This section is divided into three subsections. The first introduces the main notation
that will be used for graphs and trees. Section 3.2 introduces a class of characteristic
function games, which we call tree games, while Section 3.3 focuses on an intuitive
subclass, namely basic tree games.
3.1. Main Notation for Graphs and Trees
Throughout this paper, a graph will be denoted byG, withN(G) and E(G) being the set
of nodes and the set of edges inG, respectively. In all the graphs that will be considered
in this paper, each node will represent a unique agent. As such, a node will be denoted
by a number i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (just as we denote an agent), and a subset of nodes will be
denoted by C (just as we denote a coalition of agents). For every C ⊆ N(G), we will
write adj (C,G) to denote the nodes in N(G) \ C that are each adjacent to one or more
of the nodes in C. More formally,
adj (C,G) = {i ∈ N(G) \ C : ∃j ∈ C, (i, j) ∈ E(G)}. (3)
Furthermore, we will write GC to denote the subgraph of G that is induced by C. In
other words, we have:
N(GC) = C, (4)
E(GC) = {(i, j) ∈ E(G) : i, j ∈ C}. (5)
Next, we introduce our notation for trees. We use the notation T instead of G if the
graph happens to be a rooted tree. Since every tree considered in this paper is rooted,
we simply write “tree” instead of “rooted tree”, and write r(T ) to denote the root of T .
For every node i ∈ N(T ), let par(i, T ) be the parent of i in T , and let chi(i, T ), des(i, T )
and anc(i, T ) be the set of children, descendants, and ancestors of i in T , respectively.3
3 Observe that anc(r(T ), T ) = ∅.
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Fig. 1. An example of T , TC and TCtrim , where C = {1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9}.
Just as we denote by GC the subgraph of G induced by C, we denote by TC the
subgraph of T induced by C. Furthermore, for every i ∈ N(T ), we write Ti to denote
the subset of T rooted at i. More formally, Ti = T {i}∪des(i,T ). We denote by depth(i, T )
the depth4 of i in T , and by Level j(T ) the set of nodes in N(T ) whose depth is j. The
height of T is denoted by height(T ). Formally, height(T ) = maxi∈N(T ) depth(i, T ).
Now, let us introduce the concept of “trimming”. Basically, for every C ⊆ N(T ), by
trimming TC we obtain another subgraph TCtrim , which is the connected component in
TC that contains the root of T ; if no such component exists then TCtrim is the null graph.
An example is illustrated in Figure 1. More formally:
N(TCtrim) = {i ∈ C : anc(i, T ) ⊆ C}, (6)
E(TCtrim) = {(i, j) ∈ E(T ) : i, j ∈ N(TCtrim))}. (7)
For every C ⊆ N(T ), the subgraph TC is said to be “trimmed” if and only if TC =
TCtrim . In Figure 1, for example, the subgraphs T {1,3,6,7} and T {1,2,5} are trimmed, while
the subgraph T {1,2,8,9} is not. We will denote by Trimmed(T ) the set of coalitions that
induce trimmed subgraphs. More formally:
Trimmed(T ) =
{
C ⊆ N(T ) : TC = TCtrim
}
. (8)
Finally, for every C ⊆ N(T ), we will denote by SameTrim(C, T ) the set consisting of
every coalition C ′ ⊆ N(C) such that by trimming TC′ we obtain the same subgraph as
the one obtained by trimming TC . More formally:
SameTrim(C, T ) = {C ′ ⊆ N(T ) : TC′trim = TCtrim}. (9)
An example of Trimmed(T ) and SameTrim(C) is illustrated in Figure 2. Appendix A
provides a summary all notation introduced thus far.
3.2. Tree Games
We now show how trees induce a class of characteristic function games, which we call
tree games, and analyze some properties of these games.
Definition 3.1. [Tree Game] A tree game is a pair (T, f), where T is a tree, and
f : Trimmed(T ) → R. The set of agents in the tree game (T, f) is N(T ), and the value
4 Recall that the depth of a node in a tree is the number of edges in the path between that node and the root
of the tree. As such, the depth of the root itself is zero.
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Fig. 2. An example of Trimmed(T ) and SameTrim(C), where C = {1, 3}.
of every coalition C ⊆ N(T ) is given by:
v(C) = f
(
N(TCtrim)
)
. (10)
Intuitively, a tree game (T, f) is a characteristic function game, (A, v), where A =
N(T ) and the value of every C ⊆ N(T ) depends solely on the agents in C that are
connected to the root of T via other members of C.
We will assume throughout this paper that f(∅) = 0. As such, the following holds
since N(TCtrim) = ∅ for all C ⊆ N(T ) \ {r(T )}:
∀C ⊆ N(T ) \ {r(T )}, v(C) = 0. (11)
The following lemmas will prove useful in subsequent proofs.
LEMMA 3.2. Let (T, f) be a tree game. For every agent i ∈ N(T ), and every coalition
C ⊆ N(T ) : i ∈ C, the following holds:
i /∈ N(TCtrim) ⇒ mc(i, C \ {i}) = 0.
LEMMA 3.3. Let (T, f) be a tree game. For every agent i ∈ N(T ), and every pair of
coalitions C1, C2 ⊆ N(T ) : i ∈ C1 ∩ C2, the following holds:
TC1trim = T
C2
trim ⇒ mc(i, C1 \ {i}) = mc(i, C2 \ {i}).
LEMMA 3.4. Let (T, f) be a tree game. For every pair of coalitions C1, C2 ∈
Trimmed(T ) : C1 6= C2, the following holds:
SameTrim(C1, T ) ∩ SameTrim(C2, T ) = ∅.
LEMMA 3.5. Let (T, f) be a tree game. The following holds, where 2N(T ) is the set of
possible coalitions, i.e., subsets of N(T ):⋃
C∈Trimmed(T )
SameTrim(C, T ) = 2N(T ).
LEMMA 3.6. Let (T, f) be a tree game. For every i ∈ N(T ), the following holds:⋃
C∈Trimmed(T ):i∈C
SameTrim(C, T ) = {C ⊆ N(T ) : i ∈ N(TCtrim)}.
LEMMA 3.7. Let (T, f) be a tree game, and let C ∈ Trimmed(T ). For every coalition
C ′ ⊆ N(T ), the following holds:
C ′ ∈ SameTrim(C, T ) ⇔ (C ⊆ C ′) ∧ (C ′ ∩ adj (TCtrim , T ) = ∅)
Having outlined the necessary lemmas, we now establish a key result with respect
to the Shapley value in tree games.
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THEOREM 3.8. Let (T, f) be a tree game. For every i ∈ N(T ), the following holds:
Shi =
∑
C∈Trimmed(T ):i∈C
∣∣adj (TC , T )∣∣!(|C| − 1)!
|C ∪ adj (TC , T )|!
(
f(C)− f(C \N(Ti))
)
.
PROOF. According to Definition 2.2, the Shapley value of i can be computed using
Equation (2). For convenience, we re-write this equation below (recall that Cpii is the
coalition consisting of the agents that precede i in the permutation pi).
Shi =
1
n!
∑
pi∈ΠA
mc(i, Cpii ).
However, for every pair of permutations pi1, pi2 ∈ ΠA such that Cpi1i = Cpi2i , we have:
mc(i, Cpi1i ) = mc(i, C
pi2
i ). Based on this, the above equation can be written differently
as follows:
Shi =
1
n!
∑
C⊆N(T ):i∈C
mc(i, C \ {i})× ∣∣{pi ∈ ΠA : Cpii = C \ {i}}∣∣ .
Furthermore, for every C ⊆ N(T ) : i ∈ C, we know from Lemma 3.2 that mc(i, C\{i}) =
0 if i /∈ N(TCtrim). The Shapley value of i can then be computed as follows:
Shi =
1
n!
∑
C⊆N(T ):i∈N(TCtrim)
mc(i, C \ {i})× ∣∣{pi ∈ ΠA : Cpii = C \ {i}}∣∣ .
The above equation iterates over every C ⊆ N(T ) : i ∈ N(TCtrim). Instead, according to
Lemma 3.6, it is possible to iterate over every {C ∈ Trimmed(T ) : i ∈ C}, and for every
such C, iterate over every coalition in SameTrim(C, T ). In so doing, every coalition in
{C ⊆ N(T ) : i ∈ N(TCtrim)} would be visited exactly once, according to Lemma 3.4.
Based on this, we have:
Shi =
1
n!
∑
C∈Trimmed(T ):i∈C
∑
C′∈SameTrim(C,T )
mc(i, C′ \ {i})×
∣∣∣{pi ∈ ΠA : Cpii = C′ \ {i}}∣∣∣. (12)
Now, the definitions of Trimmed(T ) and SameTrim(C, T ), i.e., equations (8) and (9),
imply that:
∀C ∈ Trimmed(T ), C ∈ SameTrim(C, T ). (13)
Moreover, Lemma 3.3 implies that:
∀C ∈ Trimmed(T ) : i ∈ C, ∀C ′ ∈ SameTrim(C, T ), mc(i, C ′ \ {i}) = mc(i, C \ {ai}). (14)
Based on equations (13) and (14), we can write Equation (12) differently as follows:
Shi =
1
n!
∑
C∈Trimmed(T ):i∈C
mc(i, C \ {i})
∑
C′∈SameTrim(C,T )
∣∣∣{pi ∈ ΠA : Cpii = C ′ \ {i}}∣∣∣.
This can be written differently as follows (because i ∈ C and i /∈ Cpii ):
Shi =
1
n!
∑
C∈Trimmed(T ):i∈C
mc(i, C \ {i})×
∣∣∣{pi ∈ ΠA : Cpii ∪ {i} ∈ SameTrim(C, T )}∣∣∣. (15)
Next, based on Lemma 3.7, we will compute
∣∣{pi ∈ ΠN(T ) : Cpii ∪ {i} ∈ SameTrim(C, T )}∣∣
for a given coalition C ∈ Trimmed(T ) : i ∈ C. To this end, for every pi ∈ ΠN(T ),
Lemma 3.7 implies that Cpii ∪ {i} ∈ SameTrim(C, T ) if and only if Cpii ∪ {i} contains
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all the agents in C, and none of the agents in adj (TCtrim , T ). It is easy to see how the
following steps cover all possible ways to construct such a permutation:
— Step 1: Place the members of N(T ) \ (C ∪ adj (TCtrim , T )) in any slots in pi, without any
restrictions.
— Step 2: Out of all remaining slots, place the members of adj (TCtrim , T ) in the last slots,
without any restriction on the order in which those members are placed in the slots.
— Step 3: Out of all remaining slots, place i in the last slot. Steps 2 and 3 ensure that
Cpii does not contain any of the agents in adj (TCtrim , T ).
— Step 4: Place the members of C \{i} in the remaining slots in any order, without any
restrictions. Steps 3 and 4 ensure that Cpii contains all the agents in C.
— Step 4: Place the remaining members of C (other than i) in the remaining slots in
any order, without any restrictions. Steps 3 and 4 ensure that Cpii ∪ {i} contains all
the agents in C.
Let us count the number of possible ways in which each step can be performed:
— For step 1, the number is: (n)(n− 1)(n− 2) . . . (n− ∣∣N(T ) \ (C ∪ adj (TCtrim , T ))∣∣+ 1).
— For step 2, the number is:
∣∣adj (TCtrim , T )∣∣!.
— For step 3, the number is: 1.
— For step 4, the number is: (|C| − 1)!.
By multiplying those numbers, we obtain the size of the set {pi ∈ ΠN(T ) : Cpii ∪ {i} ∈
SameTrim(C, T )}, where C is a coalition in Trimmed(T ) that contains i. Based on this,
Equation (15) can be written differently as follows:
Shi =
1
n!
∑
C∈Trimmed(T ):i∈C
mc(i,C\{i})
((
n
)
...
(
n−|N(T )\(C∪adj (TCtrim ,T ))|+1
)
×|adj (TCtrim ,T )|!×
(
|C|−1
)
!
)
=
∑
C∈Trimmed(T ):i∈C
mc(i, C \ {i})
∣∣adj (TCtrim , T )∣∣!× ( |C| − 1)!(
n− ∣∣N(T ) \ (C ∪ adj (TCtrim , T ))∣∣ )!
=
∑
C∈Trimmed(T ):i∈C
mc(i, C \ {i})
∣∣adj (TCtrim , T )∣∣!× ( |C| − 1)!∣∣C ∪ adj (TCtrim , T )∣∣!
=
∑
C∈Trimmed(T ):i∈C
mc(i, C \ {i})
∣∣adj (TC , T )∣∣!× ( |C| − 1)!
|C ∪ adj (TC , T )|! (because C ∈ Trimmed(T ))
Based on this, in order to complete the proof of Theorem 3.8, it remains to show that:
mc(i, C \ {i}) = f(C)− f(C \N(Ti)). (16)
To this end, based on the definition of marginal contribution and the definition of tree
games, we know that for every tree game (T, f) and every C ⊆ N(T ) : i ∈ C, the
following holds:
mc(i, C \ {i}) = f(N(TCtrim))− f(N(TC\{i}trim )). (17)
We also know that C ∈ Trimmed(T ). Thus, based on Equation (8)—the definition of
Trimmed(T )—as well as Equation (17), we have:
mc(i, C \ {i}) = f(C)− f(N(TC\{i}trim )).
Based on this, to prove the correctness of Equation (16), it suffices to show that:
C \N(Ti) = N(TC\{i}trim ). (18)
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From the definition of Trimmed(T ), for every C ∈ Trimmed(T ) : i ∈ C, we know that
C = N(TC) = N(TCtrim), (19)
and it is easy to see that
N(TCtrim) \N(Ti) = N(TC\{i}trim ). (20)
Equations (19) and (20) imply the correctness of Equation (18) and thus conclude the
proof of Theorem 3.8.
Now that we have defined tree games, and analyzed some of their relevant prop-
erties, in the following subsections we will focus on a subclass of tree games that is
potentially relevant in some multi-level-marketing settings.
3.3. Basic Tree Games
Intuitively, basic tree games are those where the value of a coalition, C, equals the
number of agents in C that are connected to the root via other members of C. More
formally:
Definition 3.9. [Basic Tree Game] A tree game, (T, f), is said to be basic if and
only if: f(C) = |C|,∀C ∈ Trimmed(T ).
Our interest in this subclass is driven by our focus on multi-level marketing. To
see how this is relevant, recall that one of main properties of the Shapley value is
“Additivity”—for every pair of games, (N, v) and (N,w), and every agent i ∈ N , we
have: Shi(N, v) + Shi(N,w) = Shi(N, v + w), where the game (N, v + w) is defined by
(v + w)(C) = v(C) + w(C) for every C ⊆ N . While this property is admittedly not very
intuitive, it implies the linearity of the Shapley value. That is, if we scale a game—
i.e., multiply all coalition values by some constant—the Shapley values will simply be
multiplied by that same constant. To see how this relates to basic tree games, consider
a website like www.888casino.com, which claims to offer the same amount of reward,
£88 to be precise, for every subscriber. This can be interpreted as follows. For every
subset of agents C ⊆ N(T ), the reward is £88 multiplied by the number of agents in
C who reach the root via other members of C (other members of C receive no reward
simply because they did not reach the root). In other word, in the tree game (T, f)
which represents this website’s preferences, we have:
f(C) = £88× |C|, ∀C ∈ Trimmed(T ).
Now instead of computing the Shapley values in this game, it is possible—based on
the aforementioned linearity property—to first compute the Shapley values in an al-
ternative basic tree game (N, f ′), where:
f ′(C) = £1× |C|, ∀C ∈ Trimmed(T ),
and then simply multiply the resulting Shapley values by 88. This would return the
Shapley values of the original game, (T, f). More generally, for every tree game (T, f)
where there is a constant reward x for every player that reaches the root, it is possible
to first compute the Shapley values in a basic tree game which has the same tree, T ,
and then multiply the resulting Shapley values by x.
Now that we have elaborated on the intuition behind tree games, let us analyze some
of their properties.
LEMMA 3.10. In a basic tree game, (T, f), for every agent i ∈ N(T ), and every coali-
tion C ⊆ N(T ) \ {i}, the following holds:
mc(i, C) =
∣∣∣N(TC∪{i}trim ) ∩N(Ti)∣∣∣.
Towards a Fair Allocation of Rewards in Multi-Level Marketing 11
PROOF. Following the definitions of marginal contribution and basic tree games:
mc(i, C) =
∣∣∣N(TC∪{i}trim )∣∣∣− ∣∣∣N(TCtrim)∣∣∣. (21)
Furthermore, we know from Equation (6)—the definition of N(TCtrim)—that the follow-
ing holds, simply because C is a subset of C ∪ {i}:
N(TCtrim) ⊆ N(TC∪{i}trim ). (22)
Based on (21) and (22), we have:
mc(i, C) =
∣∣∣N(TC∪{i}trim ) \N(TCtrim)∣∣∣. (23)
We also know from Equation (6) that an agent j ∈ N(TC∪{i}trim ) does not belong to
N(TCtrim) if and only if i = j or i ∈ anc(j, T ); in either case we have j ∈ N(Ti). This, as
well as Equation (23), imply the correctness of the lemma.
One of the desirable properties of a basic tree game is that it is convex, as stated in
the following theorem.
THEOREM 3.11. A basic tree game is a convex game.
PROOF. It is known (see, e.g., [Elkind et al. 2013]) that a characteristic function
game is convex if and only if for every pair of coalitions C, C ′ such that C ⊂ C ′, and for
every agent i not belonging to C ′, the following holds:
mc(i, C) ≤ mc(i, C ′). (24)
Now since C ⊂ C ′, then based on Equation (6), we have:
N(T
C∪{i}
trim ) ⊆ N(TC
′∪{i}
trim ).
This, as well as Lemma 3.10, imply that the inequality in (24) holds, which implies the
correctness of Theorem 3.11.
Theorem 3.11 immediately implies that the Shapley value of a basic tree game is in
the core of that game. This makes the Shapley value-based division scheme even more
attractive, since it is not only fair but also stable (see Section 2 for more details).
THEOREM 3.12. Let (T, f) be a basic tree game. For every agent i ∈ N(T ), we have:
Shi =
height(Ti)∑
j=0
|Level j(Ti)|
depth(i, T ) + j + 1
(25)
PROOF. Since (T, f) is a basic tree game, Equation (2) and Lemma 3.10 imply that:
Shi =
1
n!
∑
pi∈ΠN(T )
∣∣∣N(TCpii ∪{i}trim ) ∩N(Ti)∣∣∣.
This can be written differently as follows:
Shi =
1
n!
∑
j∈N(Ti)
∣∣∣{pi ∈ ΠN(T ) : j ∈ N(TCpii ∪{i}trim )}∣∣∣.
Based on this, as well as (6)—the equation that defines N(TCtrim)—we have:
Shi =
∑
j∈N(Ti)
∣∣Πij∣∣
n!
, (26)
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where
Πij =
{
pi ∈ ΠN(T ) : anc(j, T ) ⊆ Cpii ∪ {i}
}
. (27)
Let us compute
∣∣Πij∣∣ /n!. Based on Equation (27), for every pi ∈ ΠN(T ), we have:
pi ∈ Πij ⇔ anc(j, T ) \ {i} ⊆ Cpii .
Thus, the number of permutations in Πij equals the number of permutations in which
all the agents in anc(j, T ) \ {i} appear before i in pi. It is easy to see how the following
steps cover all possible ways to construct such a permutation:
— Step 1: Place the members of N(T ) \ (anc(j, T ) ∪ {i}) in any slots in pi, without any
restrictions.
— Step 2: Out of all remaining slots, place i in the last one.
— Step 3: Place the members of anc(j, T ) in the remaining slots (from the previous step,
all these slots are before i) in any order, without any restrictions.
Based on this, we have:∣∣Πij∣∣ = ((n)(n− 1) . . . (n− |N(T ) \ (anc(j, T ) ∪ {i})|+ 1)) · ( |anc(j, T )|!).
This, as well as the fact that |anc(j, T )| = depth(j, T ), imply that:
∣∣Πij∣∣ = (n) . . . (depth(j, T ) + 2)(depth(j, T )) . . . (1).
Based on this, we have:∣∣Πij∣∣
n!
=
(n) . . . (depth(j, T ) + 2)(depth(j, T )) . . . (1)
(n) . . . (1)
This can be simplified as follows:∣∣Πij∣∣
n!
=
1
depth(j, T ) + 1
(28)
Finally, since j ∈ N(Ti), we have:
depth(j, T ) = depth(i, T ) + depth(j, Ti). (29)
From (26), (28) and (29), we find that:
Shi =
∑
j∈N(Ti)
1
depth(j,T )+1
=
∑
j∈N(Ti)
1
depth(i,T )+depth(j,Ti)+1
=
height(Ti)∑
j=0
∑
j∈Levelj(Ti)
1
depth(i,T )+j+1
=
height(Ti)∑
j=0
|Levelj(Ti)|
depth(i,T )+j+1
Based on Theorem 3.12, as well as the fact that height(Ti) ≤ n for all i ∈ N(T ), the
Shapley value of any agent in a basic tree game is computable in O(n) time.
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Table II. Complexity of the Shapley Value.
CFG Tree Game Basic Tree Game
Chain 2n−1 h− d+ 1 h− d+ 1
Star 2n−1 2n−2 2− d
Binary Tree 2n−1 b(h, d) h− d+ 1
Arbitrary tree 2n−1 |{C ∈ Trimmed(T ) : i ∈ C}| height(Ti) + 1
3.4. Computational Complexity of Shapley Value
We have shown that the Shapley value for basic tree games is linear-time computable.
In this section, we compare the computational complexity of the Shapley in character-
istic function games (CFG), tree games and basic tree games. We consider three stan-
dard tree structures: chain, star, and compete binary tree. Table II shows the number
of coalitions that need to be considered when computing the Shapley value of agent i
at depth d of a tree with height h = height(T ) when the total number of agents is n.
The computation for the case of a complete binary tree in tree games appears below:
b(h, d) = (yh−d + 1)2 ×
h∏
j=h−d+1
(yj + 1),
where y1 = 1 and yj = (yj−1 + 1)2 for j > 1.
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We now revisit Example 1.1. The fact that Dropbox values a coalition of extra users at
1GB per user, can be encoded as f(C) = |C| satisfying the definition of basic tree games
(see Definition 3.9). Referring to Table I, the Dropbox mechanism give the highest
reward to the user who made the most direct referrals: 3 gets three times as much as
any of the other user. Users 6 and 7 who did not invite anyone receive 500MB each.
In contrast, the geometric mechanism rewards both direct an indirect referrals but
does not give anything to non-referring nodes. The Shapley value provides a middle
ground: it acknowledges indirect referrals and also compensates non-referring nodes.
The Shapley rewards are fair in the sense that extra value is assigned to 1 relative to 3
because without the referral of 1, agent 3 would have never joined. The values for the
Shapley rewards5 appearing in Table I can be computed using (25). The rewards can
also be computed dynamically as each new user joins. Should node 7 bring a friend,
the compensation of each node would change by adding 250MB to compensations of
the new node and of nodes 1, 3, 7.
We derived a mechanism based on a fairness concept. However, it also provides par-
ticipation incentives for the agents. The property of the Shapley value that in com-
pensates the “right” types of contribution (compensation is based on the entire subtree
and not just on direct referrals) makes it more appealing for successful incentivisation
from the intuitive standpoint. Observe that without introducing some costs into the
model, any mechanism that offers a non-zero reward to the referrer and the invitee
provides rational agents with incentives to participate and to refer all of their friends.
To differentiate among Shapley and other mechanisms a future study may consider
models where costs (e.g., of making a referral) are present.
General tree games allow applying the Shapley value to scenarios where the firm’s
value for a new user depends on the identity of the user and the identities of other
users who join (this allows expressing combinatorial preferences). This is relevant,
5For the Dropbox example, where joining independently does not earn the 1GB referral bonus, we need to
modify (25) by subtracting 1 (or 1GB) from the value of the root. So the values of non-root nodes are given
by (25) and the value of the root node is given by (25) minus 1.
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for example, when the firm has a particularly high value for certain celebrities who
shape the image of the firm. This also allows modelling domains like the Red Balloon
Challenge and QINs, where the value is obtained only if a node that holds the answer
joins.
The Shapley value has a strong axiomatic justification, but its use in practice is
limited. The referral marketing domain may be a compelling setting for applying the
Shapley value. Empirical evaluation of its merits is an interesting direction for future
investigation.
Implicit in our results is the assumption that each user has only one chance to re-
ceive a referral, or in other words, that a node has a single parent through which he can
be referred. Relaxation of this assumption is a possible direction for further theoretical
work.
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A. SUMMARY OF NOTATION
A the set of agents in the game.
n the number of agents in the game.
C a coalition, i.e., a subset of A.
v(C) the value of coalition C.
CS a coalition structure, i.e., a partition of A.
CSA the set of coalition structures over A.
pi a permutation of A.
ΠA the set of all possible permutations of A.
Cpii the coalition consisting of the agents that precede i in pi.
x a payoff vector, where xi ∈ x is the payoff of agent i ∈ A.
mc(i, C) the marginal contribution of i to C, i.e., v(C ∪ {i})− v(C).
Shi the Shapley value of i.
G a graph.
GC the subgraph of G that is induced by C.
N(G) the set of nodes in G.
E(G) the set of edges in G.
adj (G′, G)
the set of nodes in G that are adjacent to G′, where G′ is an
induced subgraph of G.
T a tree.
Ti the subset of T rooted at i.
r(T ) the root of T .
chi(i, T ) the set of children of i in T .
des(i, T ) the set of descendants of i in T .
anc(i, T ) the set of ancestors of i in T .
depth(i, T ) the depth of i in T .
Level j(T ) the set of nodes in N(T ) whose depth is j.
height(T ) the height of T .
TC the subgraph of T that is induced by C.
TCtrim
the subgraph obtained by “trimming” TC . In other words, it is the
connected component in TC that contains r(T ). See Figure 1
Trimmed(T )
the set of coalitions that induce “trimmed” subgraphs. In other
words, it contains every C ⊆ N(T ) such that TC = TCtrim .
SameTrim(C, T )
the set of coalitions C ′ ⊆ N(C) such that by trimming TC′ we
obtain the same subgraph as the one obtained by trimming TC .
